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Abstract 
Blackwell and Dubins (1962) and Kalai and Lehrer (1994) showed that absolute conti­
nuity is necessary and sufficient for merging of opinions. This paper suggests the concept 
of merging of forecasts which is a modification of merging of opinions in Markov models 
where the underlying state of nature may change over time. 
We define the merging of forecasts as the conditional probabilities of the future state 
given the past observations of signals drawn conditional on the state get close to each 
other for different agents; it allows for the event that agents agree on the future evolution 
of the states even if they have not agreed in the distant past. For an ergodic Markov 
chain, any forecasts merge. In particular, we can dispense with the absolute continuity 
for merging of forecasts. 
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1 Introduction 
Consider a group of investors who forecast the prospect of a firm as more information 
about the firm becomes available over time. Will they agree about the prospect as more 
information becomes available? How different priors can they start with and yet arrive at 
an agreement? The present paper attempts to answer these questions in a setting where 
the prospect of the firm changes over time in a Markov fashion. 
Since Blackwell and Dubins ( 1962) showed that absolute continuity is sufficient for 
merging of opinions, Kalai and Lehrer ( 1994) showed that absolute continuity is also 
necessary. Absolute continuity requires that the priors of investors be compatible in the 
sense that they agree on which states are possible as the initial state. 
The paper proposes that the definition of merging of opinions be modified in a model 
where the underlying state of nature changes over time in Markov fashion to allow for the 
event that agents agree on the future evolution of the system even if they do not agree 
on the past. In particular I propose the concept of merging of forecasts which represents 
the event where conditional probabilities of the future state given the past observations 
of signals drawn conditional on the state get close to each other for different agents. 
Equipped with the definition, a stronger result on the merging is obtained. If all states 
form a single ergodic class, merging of forecasts is obtained without absolute continuity 
on the initial priors; to arrive at an agreement investors may at the beginning totally 
disagree in the sense that different investors put probability 1 on different states. For 
instance investor A believes that the firm is in the good state with probability 1 while 
investor B believes that the firm is in the bad state with probability 1. Yet after many 
time periods, the two investors agree on the probability of the current state being the 
good state and the bad state if they observe the same sequence of information. 
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2 Merging of Forecasts 
Let {St, t = 0, 1, . . .  } be a Markov chain on S = { s1, . .. , sK} with the transition law
P. Let (:E, £) be the measurable space generated by the Markov chain. We denote the 
measure on (E, £) consistent with P by µ. 
An agent observes signals Zt drawn conditionally i.i.d given the current state St, 
but not directly St. In particular the agent knows that Zt,...., f(·ISt) where f(·ISt) is the
conditional distribution. Denoting the measurable space generated by { Zt, t = 1, . . .  } 
as (D, F), we denote the measure on (D, F) by v. We assume that the signal Zt is not
perfectly informative of St :-i) supp !(·Is)= F, a measurable subset of�' for all s ES 
and ii) 0 < f(· : s) < oo for all Z E F. A filtration on (D, F) is a sequence of the set
of history Ft = { Zi, . . .  Zt} such that i) for all t, Ft E F, and Ft+l refines Ft and ii)
limt-too Ft= F. The product measureµ xv on the product space (Ex D, [ 0 F) is well
defined in a natural way. 
In period t, the agent wants to forecast the future conditional on Ft. Initially the
agent is endowed with the prior on S0, ji,0 = (Ji,6, ... , 'ji,{f) while the true prior is denoted
as µ0 = (µa, . . .  , µ{f). We denote the probability measure consistent with 'ji,0 as µ, and
thus Ji, x v for the probability measure that the agent works with.
We denote the projection of E for t 2'.. n by En and similarly the projection of D, 
nn. The sets En and nn accompanied by the o--algebras En and ?contain only the 
future evolution of the system from period n and on. We define thatµ x v is absolutely 
continuous with respect to µ x v from n, denoted µ x v «n µ, x v, if for all A E [n 0
Fn, there is o > 0 such thatµ x v(A) ::; o · ('ji, x v(A)). 
The agent's conditional distribution of an event A E [ 0 F given Ft is denoted as
µ x v{AIFt}· The agent's forecastµ, xv merges toµ xv if for every E > 0, and almost
every w E [ 0 F, there is t (c,w) satisfying 1/1 x v{St+1IFt} -µ x v{St+1IFt}I < E for
every t 2'._ t(E, w) .
Theorem 1 Suppose {St, t = 0, 1, . . . } admits a single ergodic class. Then the agent's 
forecastµ merges to µ. 
The proof is accomplished through a few steps. 
Proposition 1 If {St, t = 0, 1 ,  . . . } admits a single ergodic class, then there is n such
that µ x v is absolutely continuous with respect to µ x v from n. 
Proof: First we show that if {St, t = 0, 1, . . .  } admits a· single ergodic class, thenµ: > 0
implies that µ�+I > 0. Suppose not, namely µ� > 0 implies that Ji�+l = 0. Since Zt is
not perfectly informative, the observation of Zt cannot make 11:+1 = 0. Therefore Pkk = 0
where Pkk is the probability from the state k to itself and µ{ = 0 for all j E J where J is
the set of immediate predecessors in the Markov chain, that is Pjk > 0 for all j E J. The
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same argument is applied to all states in J in period t, that is, Pj'j = 0 for all j, j' E J
and ji�_1 = 0 for all i E I where I is the set of immediate predecessors of the states in J.
This argument can be applied only a finite times before the process returns to the state 
k since {St} is a recurrent Markov chain and thus there is rt :::; K such that p�k > 0 and
Pkk = 0 for all l < rt· A contradiction since {St} is aperiodic.
Second there is n E N such that jj� > 0 for all k since all states are recurrent. 
It remains to show that there is n such that for all A E £n 0 ? , there is 8 > 0 such
thatµ x v(A):::; 8 · (ji x v(A)). Consider n that jj� > 0 for all k. Then for A E t:n 0 ?,
K 




< MLPr{AISn = s
k}
k=l 
M K -(m 2:Pr{AISn = sk})m k=l 
M K < -(Lfi�Pr{AISn = s
k})
m k=l 
M (Ji x v(A))
m 
where M = maxk{µ�} and m = mink{Ji�}. Taking 8 = � completes the proof. I 
Proposition 2 Ifµ x v is absolutely continuous with respect to Ji x v, then Ji x v merges 
toµ xv. 
For proof, see Blackwell and Dubins ( 1962) and Kalai and Lehrer ( 1994). 
Proof: (Theorem 1) From Proposition 1, µxv «n µxv. Applying Proposition 2 to the
projection of the process from period n and on, namely (I:n x n,n, t:n 0 ;:n), completes
the proof since {St+1} E t:n 0 ;:n, t 2:: n. I
3 Merging of Forecasts and Merging of Opinions 
Consider a problem whether a jury can agree on the verdict of a suspect. Individual jurors 
are required to have unbiased opinions before the trial in the sense that they are prepared 
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to allow either conviction or acquittal based on the evidence being fed to them in the 
court. Otherwise a juror's eventual opinion may not depend on the evidence provided 
in the court but it may be entirely determined by the prior. Hence the verdict may not 
be consistent with the evidence. To avoid this, jurors are required to have an unbiased 
opinion initially. Using the terminology of Kalai and Lehrer ( 1993), their probability 
measures must contain a grain of truth. 
However, in the problem of investors, they do not have to agree on the past event in 
order to agree on the future prospect of the firm. As long as they are aware that the 
firm's prospect may change over time, observing a long string of common data enables 
agents to agree on the future prospect. In this circumstance the past is relevant only to 
the extent that it helps agents forecasts the future. In particular a disagreement as to 
the past does not prevent an agreement as to the future. 
The difference between merging of forecasts and merging of opinions lie in that the 
former explicitly restricts the event to be considered to the future ones; merging of 
opinions requires that probability measures on all events including the past as well as 
the future get close to each other and thus it is a stronger condition. 
The restriction of events to the future in the definition of merging of forecasts yields 
a case where merging of forecasts holds true while merging of opinions does not. In 
particular in the problem of investors, merging of opinions does not hold true without 
the absolute continuity on the initial priors although merging of forecasts holds true 
regardless of the initial priors. It happens only when the future can be different from the 
past. 
Indeed casting the statistical inference problem due to Blackwell and Dubins (1962) 
into a Markov chain sheds lights on the issue. We can regard the statistical inference 
problem as the one where each possible value of unknown parameter constitutes an 
absorbing state of a Markov chain since the unknown parameter is fixed once and for all. 
In this circumstance, the prediction of the future evolution of signals which are drawn 
conditional on the parameter will get close to each other only if the agents start with 
priors which are absolutely continuous with each other. Hence employing the concept of 
merging of forecasts instead of merging of opinions does not yield any different result. 
vVe can regard an ergodic Marko\' chain as a model with built-in grain-of-truth. In 
this class of models, absolute continuity among probability measures exist inherently 
in the system since one cannot permanently exclude a realization of any state in the 
stochastic process; even if one does initially, there is a strictly positive probability that 
the process visits any state. The observation is important since the failure of merging 
of opinions results from the fact that Bayesian updating per se cannot put a positive 
probability measure on an event whose prior is zero. 
The role of aperiodicity in the proof of proposition 1 suggests an interesting example. 
For instance, consider a Markov chain with alternating two states so that it has the 
periodicity of 2. In this case two agents with the opposite degenerate priors may never 
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agree; although they realize that there is a positive probability of visiting each state, 
they assign probability 1 to either of the state in any particular period, hence leaving no 
room for Bayesian updating to work on the belief conditional on the observation of the 
signal draws. 
Recently increasing attention has been paid to dynamic models where the state 
changes in Markov fashion. For models in this class, our result has a positive implication. 
Although the issue of merging of forecasts or merging of opinions is rarely addressed in 
those models explicitly, it can be a very important underlying issue if divergent opinions 
change result drastically which is typical in models with heterogeneity among agents. 
Furthermore the ever-changing nature of the state could introdu.ce additional complexity 
in the model. Our positive result implies that in the class of models frequently used in 
economics, an even stronger result can be obtained. In particular, absolute continuity is 
not required if the states constitute a single ergodic class. 
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